CHINA AND
THE SECOND SPACE AGE
15 October 2003
(courtesy of
Futron
Corporation)
Introduction
The Chinese space program has
not received significant review by the general population over the years. This
is due in part because of the methodical approach the Chinese have used for its
space program and the historical tendency of the Chinese government towards not
publicizing its activities.
However, with the launch today of
China’s first human spaceflight mission, Shenzhou 5, China’s space
program has jumped onto the national headlines. Futron developed this White
Paper to describe the China’s past, current, and future space program. The
information in this White Paper is based on publicly-available
information.
China and The Second Space Age
A recent study conducted by
Futron Corporation on behalf of NASA focused on worldwide government and
commercial space activities over the next 20 years. While the intent of the
study was to determine the market share effect of an RLV introduced into the
worldwide launch market, the baseline analyses revealed some interesting trends
in government space activities.
The United States is expected to
continue its military and civil space programs in earnest; however, the overall
trend in terms of annual U.S. launch events will remain essentially flat
through 2021. The forecast showed a more pessimistic outlook for Russia.
Russia’s government space activities will amount to a substantial
reduction in launches from previous decades due to a reduced space budget in
recent years (estimated to be between $300 to 400 million per year). The
Russian government has been forced to prioritize its spending on space
programs, focusing on the International Space Station, while de-emphasizing
communications, navigation, and certain remote sensing platforms.
In
contrast to this “draw down” in space activity by the superpowers
responsible for the Space Race of the 20th century, Futron projects that
China’s space activity will increase in the number of orbital launch
events through 2021. China will be launching up to ten times a year - this
represents an increase of 50 percent from previous years (see Figure
1).
This launch rate is still well below the U.S. launch rate; and,
China’s current annual spending on government space programs is about $2.2
billion, compared with $26 billion for the United States.1 However, it nevertheless represents a major scaling up of
Chinese space activity dedicated to human spaceflight and key satellite
programs.
1 Johnson, Tim, “China's
launch of its first manned spaceship expected within days,” Knight Ridder,
October 7, 2003.
China’s Space Activities in Context
China appears ready to enter
space with a degree of ambition matching the Americans and Soviets during the
1960s, when sending humans into orbit and beyond became a method of
demonstrating superior technical and economic competence. The capability to
send humans into space is still seen as a pinnacle of achievement, a perception
that may translate well in terms of attracting international investment,
gaining additional respect among peers across the globe, and stoking domestic
pride and inspiration.2 China has recognized this
for some time, but has taken a much more deliberate approach to sending people
into space than the United States and the Soviet Union.
The United
States and the Soviet Union, for example, sent humans into space within a few
years of launching their first satellites. Perhaps even more remarkable, both
nations directed plans almost immediately to send humans to the Moon, with the
United States achieving this feat within ten years of launching its first
astronaut. China, in contrast, launched its first satellite in 1970,
capitalizing on the technical genius and leadership of Dr. Tsien Hsue-shen,
considered the father of modern Chinese rocketry. It took the country over
thirty years from the launch of that small satellite, Dongfanghong-1 (DFH-1,
pictured in Figure 2), to the launch of Shenzhou 5, the first Chinese vehicle
carrying a Chinese astronaut.
The Chinese government decided
to pursue a more scaled down space program in the 1970s than that of the
Americans and Soviets, dedicating its smaller economic and technological
capability to pursuing more manageable projects like communication satellites
and orbital remote sensing platforms.
It is interesting to note that the
space programs of each country were established in no small part because of the
influence and vision of three key individuals, each with special connections to
their respective governments and a personal drive to see people live and work
in space.
In the United States, Wernher von Braun used his training,
charisma, and close associates to craft a master plan for Americans in space.
The Soviets had as their champion, Sergei Korolev. Korolev was considered the
center of Soviet space efforts until his death in 1966, an event which some
experts think derailed the Soviet effort to land a man on the Moon. Likewise,
Tsien, who earned his education and subsequent experience in rocket engineering
in the United States, was an essential player in convincing the Chinese
government that the country needed a space program.
2 There is some evidence to suggest that the general
population of China is relatively unaware of its government’s space
program. It will be interesting to note how the Chinese will respond to the
first flight of a Chinese astronaut.
Tsien Hsue-shen
Dr. Tsien Hsue-shen was born in
Hangzhou, China in 1911. After what appears to be an ordinary childhood, he
traveled to the United States in 1935 on a scholarship, ultimately becoming a
protégé of Theodor von Karman at the California Institute of
Technology.
Tsien applied to become an American citizen
in 1949, but was isolated by accusations of being a communist sympathizer. In
1950, Tsien was accused by the United States of being a Communist Party member,
an action that terminated his security clearance and his ability to conduct
further research. He attempted to return to China; but, was detained under
house arrest until 1955 when he was released and free to return to
China.
The Chinese government, with Tsien in the lead, negotiated a 1956
agreement with the Soviet Union for transfer of rocket and nuclear technology,
including the training of Chinese students at Soviet universities. Sino-Soviet
relations soured a few years later, and in 1960 the Soviet Union discontinued
its cooperation with China. Tsien continued his work on the core technologies
shared by the Soviets, and established the Space Flight Medical Research Center
in 1968 to prepare for human space flights. In 1970 he successfully launched
DFH-1, China’s first satellite, using the Long March 1 launch vehicle, a
modified intercontinental ballistic missile. Tsien then introduced his human
spaceflight project, called Shuguang-1, aiming to put a Chinese man into space
by 1973. Due to changing political conditions, the Chinese government cancelled
the human spaceflight program and directed Tsien to develop a new line of Long
March vehicles based on the Long March 1.
In 1974, China began its
satellite remote sensing program with the successful launch of Fanhui Shei
Weixing-1 (FSW-1), a satellite that used a reentry film capsule similar to the
Corona system developed by the United States over ten years earlier. The FSW
reentry capsule would prove to be integral part of China’s future human
spaceflight plans.
Tsien continued to champion a
human space program, and in 1978 he introduced a project with roots to his 1949
space plane concept. This vehicle system bore a striking resemblance to the
X-20 Dyna Soar, a cancelled project the United States Air Force pursued in the
mid- to late-1960s. But Tsien’s spaceplane (pictured on the left) never
made it off the drawing board. Instead, China decided in 1978 to pursue a
method of sending astronauts into space using the more familiar FSWderived
ballistic reentry capsules. Two years later the Chinese government cancelled
the program citing cost concerns.
The Chinese government directed Tsien
to focus on more practical satellite programs. Additionally, the country
decided to enter the international commercial launch market in 1985 and
revisited an initiative to develop the Long March 2 series of launch vehicles
to address these new priorities, ultimately introducing 12 launch vehicle
variants. China also built three launch sites: Jiuquan, for launch to
midinclination orbits, Xichang for launch to geosynchronous orbit, and Taiyuan
for polar orbits.
Between 1985 and 2000, China conducted 18 commercial
launches, usually at launch prices significantly lower than equivalent vehicles
offered by American and European providers. During the late 1990s, an embargo
on Chinese commercial launches was levied by the United States over improper
technology transfers, and quotas were negotiated in an effort to moderate the
effects of China’s launch price undercutting. These measures, combined
with the collapse of the low Earth orbit satellite communications market, have
effectively ended commercial launch activity in China in the
near-term.
While China continued to launch government missions, a human
spaceflight program remained beyond China’s funded priorities. In 1984,
President Reagan offered to fly a Chinese astronaut on the Space Shuttle, but
the Chinese were not interested. Then, China began a five-year effort beginning
in 1983 to sign various United Nations treaties on space and began
participating in international space conferences. China appeared to be
preparing for a new era in its space development effort. But Tsien was not
going to play a major role. He retired in 1991, and currently lives just
outside of Beijing.
Shenzhou is Born
In 1992, China decided that a
human spaceflight program could be funded. The Chinese government directed that
a human-tended spacecraft be launched before the new millennium in order to
establish China’s place as “one of the Great Powers.”
China’s human spaceflight program was designated Project 921, to be
executed according to three phases. Phase One was to be a crewed space capsule
with first flight by October 1999. The second phase was to be a space station.
The final phase was the development and fielding of a reusable launch vehicle
(RLV) to be operational by 2020.
The international community received
its first glimpse of China’s Project 921 when its Phase One spacecraft was
revealed on paper in 1992. The spacecraft resembled the Russian Soyuz, with a
service module, a reentry capsule, and a forward orbital module. A new heavy
launch vehicle capable of carrying the capsule was also on the drawing
boards.
In 1994, Russia sold some of its advanced aviation and space
technology to the Chinese. In 1995 a deal was signed between the two countries
for the transfer of Russian Soyuz spacecraft technology to China. Included in
the agreement was training, provision of Soyuz capsules, life support systems,
docking systems, and space suits. In 1996 two Chinese astronauts, Wu Jie and Li
Qinglong, began training at the Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center in
Russia. After training, these men returned to China and proceeded to train
other Chinese astronauts at sites near Beijing and Jiuquan. The hardware and
information sold by the Russians led to modifications of the original Phase One
spacecraft, eventually called Shenzhou, which loosely translated means
“divine vessel.” New launch facilities were built at the Jiuquan
launch site in Inner Mongolia, and in the spring of 1998 a mock-up of the Long
March 2F launch vehicle with Shenzhou spacecraft was rolled out for integration
and facility tests.
In February
1999, the Chinese government authorized funding for Phase Two of Project 921 -
the development and eventual operation of a “Salyut-type” space
station. Facilities were built to test station components soon afterward. In
July of that same year, the last of China’s tracking and telemetry ships
was built, completing a fleet of three ships. China then successfully tested
the Long March 2F with an uncrewed Shenzhou aboard on November 20, 1999. This
flight was followed by Shenzhou 2 in January 10, 2001, Shenzhou 3 on March 25,
2002, and Shenzhou 4 on December 30, 2002. Shenzhou 5, carrying the first
Chinese astronaut, Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei, was successfully launched
today, October 15, 2003.
During the earlier Shenzhou flight tests, the
Chinese government introduced a followon plan to launch a large
“Skylab-type” space station in 2010. This station will be launched by
a Long March 5, China’s next generation heavy-lift booster. In the
meantime, Shenzhou capsules are planned to dock with “Salyut-type”
space station modules launched by Long March 2E or Long March 2F vehicles. In
addition to the Shenzhou-station missions, China intends to conduct a mission
to circumnavigate the Moon in a similar manner as was carried out by Apollo 8
in 1968. This mission will apparently involve a modified Shenzhou spacecraft
and will be launched around 2006.
Who’s Doing What in China’s Space Programs
The organizational structure
and evolution of China’s space program is complicated and constantly
undergoing change. Today, the management and operation of China’s space
activities are carried out by the China National Space Administration (CNSA),
established in June 1993. CNSA is roughly the equivalent of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Because China’s public
and “private industries” are very intertwined, a separate group of
organizations is charged with providing the hardware, software, and research
and development for the CNSA (see Figure 3), all under the auspices of the
China Aerospace Corporation (CASC).
CASC is divided into two large
organizations: China Aerospace Machinery and Electronics Corporation (CAMEC),
and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASTC). The
administration and management of facilities, payroll, and other similar
functions fall to State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for
National Defense (COSTIND). CASC headquarters is in Beijing, and the
organization oversees the activities of 250,000 employees.
The majority
of space-related industrial activity is conducted by CASTC. Space projects are
mostly divided among three key organizations under CASTC. ChinaAcademy of Space
Technology (CAST) oversees institutes and factories related to research,
development, and production of communications, space-based military systems,
navigation satellites, data relay satellites, and weather satellites. It also
conducts research and development on space station and RLV technology. China
Academy of Launch Technology (CALT) conducts research, development, and
production of launch vehicles, liquid-fueled surface-to-surface missiles, and
solidfueled surface-to-surface and submarine-launched missiles, among which is
the Long March family of space launch vehicles. Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight
Technology (SAST) is responsible for tactical air defense missiles and carrier
rockets. The organization originally developed the Long March 1, 2, and 3
series of vehicles, including the guidance systems.
A third grouping of
organizations also falls under CASC. Commercial launch campaigns are contracted
through the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). CGWIC is managed
under a conglomerate called the China Great Wall Industry Group (CGWIG), which
also oversees the China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation
(CPMEIC).
Future Chinese Space Activities
In 1999, the Chinese
government directed the CNSA to follow a ten-year space plan. CNSA was tasked
with building up an integrated military and civilian Earth observation system
using meteorological, Earth resource, oceanic, and disaster monitoring
satellites, all coordinated for receiving, processing, and distributing data to
both civilian and military users.
This effort was
begun with launch of the Ziyuan-2 satellite in 2000. The Chinese government
also directed CNSA to establish an indigenously built geosynchronous satellite
broadcasting and telecommunications system using partnerships made with Western
companies to increase the level of Chinese technology. Sinosat-1, launched in
1998, was the first such cooperative project between the Chinese and European
aerospace industries. The technology would be used to develop new FH-1 military
and DFH-4 civilian communications satellites to form a command-and-control
network designed to link Chinese combat forces. Deployment of the new
constellation began with Zhongxing 22, launched in January
2000.
Establishing a geosynchronous satellite navigation and positioning
system and maturing the industry for providing value-added services constitutes
another of CNSA’s directives. In the early 1980s, China began to utilize
the American Navstar and Russian Glonass systems to develop the application
technology of satellite navigation and positioning. After joining the
COSPAS-SARSAT search and rescue system in 1992, China established the Chinese
Mission Control Center, now used to operate China’s Beidou navigation
satellites, the first of which was launched in 2000. The development of a new
generation of scientific research and technological experiment satellites also
falls under the purview of the CNSA. These would conduct studies in
microgravity, materials science, life sciences, space environment, astronomy,
and preliminary studies for human exploration of the Moon.
CNSA is
currently upgrading China’s launch vehicles in an effort to improve the
performance and reliability of the Long March family, while simultaneously
developing a new generation of expendable launch vehicles (the Long March 5
series) using nontoxic, high-performance propellants with lower operating
costs. Work has also been under way to provide a commercially available small
launch vehicle called Kaitouzhe. This new solid propellant vehicle has been
launched twice, failing both times for undisclosed reasons.
Regarding human spaceflight initiatives, CNSA is to continue
pursuing the Shenzhou program and complete research and development for future
human space projects (Phase Two “Skylab-type” space station and
Shenzhou Circumlunar Mission). This responsibility is extended in China’s
20-year plan, which directs CNSA to establish some sort of orbital space
laboratory, and a research base on the Moon. The Project 921 Phase Three RLV
was not mentioned as a realistic development project beyond 2000, with some
speculating that difficulties experienced with the development of an RLV in the
United States may have caused the Chinese to abandon such
plans.
CNSA’s 20-year plan goes a bit further, concentrating more
on maturing the industrial base necessary for sustaining government space
operations. This includes modernizing the aerospace industrialization process,
marketing of space technology and applications, and establishing an integrated
space infrastructure and a satellite ground application system integrating
spacecraft and ground equipment.
Bibliography
China’s Century.
Laurence J. Brahm. John Wiley & Sons, 2001.
China’s Great
Leap Upward. Scientific American. James Oberg. October 2003.
NASA
ASCENT Final Report. Futron Corporation Report to NASA MSFC,
2002.
The Chinese Space Programme: From Conception to Future
Capabilities. Brian Harvey, John Wiley & Sons, 1998.
The
Coming Collapse of China. Gordon Change. Random House, 2003.
The
State of China Atlas. Robert Benewick and Stephanie Donald. Penguin
Reference, 1999.
Thread of the Silkworm. Iris Chang. Basic Books,
1996.
Tsien Revisited. Caltech News, Volume 36, Number 1. Frank
Marble. 2002.
When Dragons Fly: An Overview of China’s Manned
Spaceflight Program. Interspace News. Philip Chien.
2002.
www.astronautix.com. Mark Wade, accessed October 13,
2002.
www.spacedaily.com. Accessed October 12, 2003.
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